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Measuring Corruption in Public Construction Projects in China 1 
Ming Shan1, Albert P.C. Chan2, Yun Le3*, Bo Xia4, and Yi Hu5 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
Corruption has been identified as the greatest obstacle to economic and social development. 4 
Public construction projects, in particular, face high corruption risk as public construction 5 
sector has been consecutively deemed as the most corrupt one. Despite considerable efforts 6 
have been undertaken to measure corruption at a nation level, few focus on the measurement 7 
of corruption in construction projects. This paper develops a fuzzy measurement model for 8 
the potential corruption in public construction projects in China. Through semi-structured 9 
interviews with 14 experts, followed by a questionnaire survey with 188 respondents, 24 10 
measurement items of corruption were identified and further categorized into five constructs. 11 
The fuzzy set theory was then adopted to quantify each measurement item, construct and the 12 
overall corruption level. This model can facilitate in evaluating, revealing and monitoring 13 
corruption in public construction projects. Although this study focuses on measuring 14 
corruption in public construction projects in China, similar research methods can be applied 15 
in other countries around the world and thus contribute to the global body of knowledge of 16 
corruption. 17 
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INTRODUCTION 20 
Compared with developed countries, those developing countries have more serious corruption 21 
problems as they are undergoing the transition of economy and lack mature legislative and 22 
administrative system (Ofori 2000; Ling and Hoang 2010). As a typical developing country, 23 
China is unexceptional (Shan et al. 2014). The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention 24 
reveals that 15,010 persons were prosecuted for corruption in the public construction sector 25 
between 2009 and 2011, which caused an estimated loss of CNY 3 billion (approximately 26 
USD 490 million) (Xinhua Net 2011). Moreover, people involved in corruption not only 27 
include clerks at the bottom but also top leaders at the ministerial level or above. A 28 
notorious case is Xilai Bo, who used to be a member of The Political Bureau of the 29 
Communist Party of China Central Committee, and also the chief leader of Chongqing City 30 
(i.e. a deputy national leader of the country), was found to have grafted CNY 5 million 31 
(approximately USD 0.81 million) during the construction of a public project (Xinhua Net 32 
2013a). Another notorious case is Zhijun Liu, the former minister of Ministry of Railways (i.e. 33 
minister level), who grafted CNY 64.6 million (approximately USD 10.5 million) within the 34 
construction of Chinese railway projects (Xinhua Net 2013b). Although nowadays some 35 
anti-corruption measures have been put in place actively by the new leader of the 36 
country, President Jinping Xi, and that the positive effects of these measures are 37 
emerging, there is still a long way to go for Chinese people in curbing corruption 38 
(Beijing Times 2014). 39 
3 
Le et al. (2014a) has conducted a comprehensive literature review on corruption research 40 
in construction in the past two decades, and found that existing research interests of 41 
corruption mainly focused on forms of corruption in construction, impacts of corruption in 42 
construction, and anti-corruption strategies, but little on the measurement of corruption in 43 
construction, which is an important aspect in addressing corruption issues. Therefore, this 44 
study aims to develop a systematic model to measure the potential corruption in a public 45 
construction project. It is envisaged that this model can play a vital role in assessing and 46 
monitoring corruption within the Chinese public construction projects. 47 
LITERATURE REVIEW 48 
Corruption is a type of dishonest or fraudulent practice conducted by those morally depraved 49 
individuals in power, who usually misuse the public power for their private benefit (Gray and 50 
Kaufman 1998; Oxford Dictionaries 2014). This wrong doing distorts markets and the 51 
allocation of resources, and is therefore to reduce economic efficiency and growth (Tanzi 52 
1998; Jain 2001; Marquette 2001). Moreover, corruption can give rise to a dirty image of the 53 
country and degrade public trust (Ika et al. 2012). With respect to the construction industry, 54 
there has even been an increase of corruption within the sector in recent years (Alutu 2007; 55 
Ameh and Odusami 2007; Sohail and Cavill 2008; de Jong et al. 2009; Bowen et al. 2012; 56 
Gunduz and Önder 2013; Le et al. 2014a). In particular, the public construction sector has 57 
been consecutively deemed as the most corrupt sector according to the Bribe Payers Index 58 
published by Transparency International (1999; 2002; 2006; 2008; 2011). The negative 59 
impacts of corruption on the construction sector include unfair resource allocation, waste of 60 
public money, low quality of construction work, and foremost, the undermining of free 61 
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competition in the business (Sohail and Cavill 2008; Tabish and Jha 2011; Le et al. 2014b). 62 
Measurement of corruption is necessary to achieve progress towards greater integrity, 63 
transparency, and accountability in corruption free performance (Andersson and Heywood 64 
2009; Goel and Nelson 2011; Foster et al. 2012; León et al. 2013). Only by understanding 65 
how much corruption and in what areas, can effective anti-corruption strategies be formulated 66 
and then implemented (Sampford et al. 2006). Kaufmann et al. (1999) therefore created an 67 
aggregate measure of corruption combining three elements of governance, namely, probity, 68 
bureaucratic quality, and rule of law. Hall and Yago (2000) developed an index of opacity, 69 
which is the opposite of transparency. Additionally, extensive efforts have been devoted to the 70 
measurement of corruption at the country level by many international organizations, such as 71 
Business International Corporation, the Political Risk Services Group, World Economic 72 
Forum, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd., Transparency International, and World 73 
Bank (Mauro 1995; Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Lambsdorff 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 74 
1997; Jain 2001; Svensson 2005). However, rare literature was found to focus on the 75 
measurement of corruption in the construction sector. Thus, this study attempts to bridge this 76 
knowledge gap by developing a systematic evaluation model of corruption in construction 77 
projects. 78 
DATA COLLECTION 79 
Data source is critical for measuring corruption, which includes perception indicators, judicial 80 
system reports, and indirect and outcome indicators (e.g., objective indictors covering 81 
financial flows, sector outcomes) (Kenny 2009). Data from judicial system reports can 82 
improve the precision of measurement and disclose more significant details of corruption 83 
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(Della Porta 2001), but those judicial reports are rarely available by the public (Han 2011). 84 
Although indirect and outcome indicators can be widely available, the reliability of results 85 
derived from these data may be compromised because factors other than corruption might 86 
contribute to the final evaluation (Ko and Samajdar 2010). In this study, perception indicators 87 
were used to solicit perception-based data to measure corruption in public construction 88 
projects. This data collection method has also been widely used for the measurement of 89 
corruption at a country level (Mauro 1995; Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Lambsdorff 1998; 90 
Andersson and Heywood 2009; Goel and Nelson 2011; Foster et al. 2012). Although 91 
subjective data collected by such approach can only reflect vague and generic perceptions of 92 
corruption rather than specific objective realities and thus sometimes unreliable (Golden and 93 
Picci 2001; Duncan 2006; Seligson 2006), perceptions of corruption based on respondents’ 94 
actual experiences are, in most cases, the best and the only information the researchers can 95 
obtain as corruption is usually carried out clandestinely and leaves no paper trail (Jain 2001). 96 
A series of semi structured interviews and a questionnaire survey were employed sequentially 97 
in this study as tools for data collection because such a combination of methods has been 98 
advocated and can overcome inherent limitations of a single method (Zhao et al. 2014a).  99 
Semi	Structured	Interviews	100 
To identify measurement items of corruption, semi structured interviews were first conducted 101 
between July 2013 and August 2013 with 14 industrial experts and academics. Table 1 shows 102 
the backgrounds of the interviewees. Apparently, most of interviewees have sufficient 103 
working experience (more than 10 years) and hold senior positions in their organizations. 104 
Diversified professional backgrounds and geographic locations of interviewees also help 105 
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increase the heterogeneity of the interviewee panel and thus improve the validity of 106 
interviews.  107 
(Please insert Table 1 here.) 108 
As Tabish and Jha (2011) has already gathered a comprehensive list of 61 measurement 109 
items of corruption in Indian public construction projects, this list will be adopted and serve 110 
as the basis for the development of measurement items specifically for construction projects 111 
in China. Interviewees were requested to evaluate the applicability of each item from Tabish 112 
and Jha (2011) to the public construction sector of China, by using a five-point rating system 113 
(1 = very inapplicable, 2 = inapplicable, 3 = medium, 4 = applicable, and 5 = very applicable). 114 
Interviewees were also encouraged to supplement other measurement items that they had in 115 
mind but had not been included in Tabish and Jha’s (2011) framework. The mean score of 116 
each measurement item was calculated, and a threshold of 2.5 points was established as a 117 
cut-off criterion as recommended by Hsueh et al. (2009).  118 
Based on the interview results, as shown in Table 2, 19 items from Tabish and Jha’s 119 
(2011) framework received evaluation scores above 2.5 points, suggesting that their 120 
applicability in the Chinese public construction sector were confirmed. Due to the objective 121 
difference between the construction sectors of India and China, other items from Tabish and 122 
Jha’s (2011) framework, for example, “the reimbursement of service tax, excise duty, etc. is 123 
not done after obtaining the actual proof of depositing the same”, and “the recoveries for 124 
statutory taxes/duties not made before releasing the payment”, were regarded as inapplicable 125 
to measure the corruption in the context of China (with applicability score lower than 2.5 126 
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points), and thus were excluded from the list of measurement items. To verify if there is 127 
significant difference among the interviewees of different backgrounds (i.e., employer, 128 
experience, geographic locations), the Kruskal-Walis test was conducted with the aid of 129 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 17.0. According to Siegel and Castellan 130 
(1988), the significant difference is proved when the asymptotic significance value is lower 131 
than 0.05. The testing results in Table 2 show that all the asymptotic significance values are 132 
greater than 0.05, which indicates that no significant differences exist among the interviewees 133 
of different backgrounds. 134 
(Please insert Table 2 here.) 135 
 Additionally, a complement of five new measurement items was recommended by the 136 
interviewees according to their own experience, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, a total of 24 137 
measurement items of corruption were finalized through interviews.  138 
(Please insert Table 3 here.) 139 
Questionnaire	Survey	140 
As a systematic data collection method, the questionnaire survey technique has been widely 141 
used to collect professional views in construction management research (such as Deng et al. 142 
2014; Hwang et al 2014; Le et al. 2014b; Zhao et al. 2013a). Thus, following the 143 
semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire survey was conducted to obtain the 144 
perception-based data of the measurement items of corruption from two perspectives, namely, 145 
probability (i.e., the possibility of occurrence of each measurement item) and severity (i.e., 146 
the impact of consequence of each measurement item), using a five-point rating scale (1 = 147 
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very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, 5 = very high). The questionnaire was disseminated 148 
through three channels between September 2013 and October 2013. First, an online version of 149 
the questionnaire was developed and disseminated to experts from government agencies, 150 
research institutes, and enterprises involved in public construction projects in China. Second, 151 
hard copies of the questionnaire were distributed in a one-to-one interview way to some 152 
participants of an industrial forum held in Shanghai, who are required to have experience in 153 
Chinese public construction projects. Third, field surveys were conducted in three public 154 
construction projects in Shanghai, Jinan (the capital city of Shandong Province), and 155 
Zhengzhou (the capital city of Henan Province), respectively. Moreover, two particular 156 
measures were taken to ensure the reliability of the survey feedbacks. First, the questionnaire 157 
was administered in an anonymous way. Second, the respondents were asked to evaluate the 158 
measurement items of corruption merely based on their knowledge to the industry rather than 159 
the projects they were engaging in. The three survey approaches adopted in this study are 160 
expected to enhance the validity of the survey results. Finally, 188 valid replies were received. 161 
Among them, 87 replies were collected from the online survey, 20 from the industrial forum, 162 
and 81 from the field surveys. 163 
Table 4 shows profile of respondents of the questionnaire survey. The respondents are 164 
from diversified organizations (i.e., government, client, contractor, consultant, designer, and 165 
academic) involved in public construction projects in China. More than 70% of them had at 166 
least 6 years of experience in this sector and held middle managerial positions or above in 167 
their organizations. In addition, the respondents were selected from different geographic 168 
locations of China in order to provide a more general situation of corruption in the public 169 
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construction sector across the country.  170 
(Please insert Table 4 here.) 171 
DATA ANALYSIS 172 
To check the reliability of the data collected from the questionnaire survey, Cronbach’s 173 
coefficient alpha was tested with the aid of SPSS 17.0, as suggested by Netemeyer et al. 174 
(2003). The testing result revealed a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.902, which indicates a high 175 
level of internal consistency among the respondents (Netemeyer et al. 2003). 176 
Table 5 shows the evaluations of 24 measurement items. The Top5 measurement items in 177 
terms of probability are MI17 (3.71 points), MI12 (3.54 points), MI16 (3.52 points), MI15 178 
(3.45 points), and MI4 (3.43 points). The Top5 measurement items in terms of severity are 179 
MI23 (4.06 points), MI24 (4.00 points), MI17 (3.80 points), MI22 (3.73 points), and MI21 180 
(3.70 points). The Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed with the aid of SPSS 17.0 to check 181 
if there is significant difference among the respondents of different professional backgrounds 182 
(i.e. employer, position, experience, and geographic location). Given all the asymptotic 183 
significance values are greater than 0.05, there is no such significant difference among the 184 
respondents (Siegel and Castellan 1988). Therefore, the data are appropriate to be further 185 
analyzed.  186 
(Please insert Table 5 here.) 187 
Normally, an evaluation model is developed from a hierarchical framework (Xu et al. 188 
2010). Therefore, to hierarchize the framework of measurement items of corruption, factor 189 
analysis was conducted utilizing SPSS 17.0. As recommended by Chan et al. (2010) and Xia 190 
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and Chan (2012), Principal component analysis was conducted to identify the underlying 191 
constructs of measurement items for its simplicity and distinctive capacity of data reduction. 192 
Assuming that there are correlations among various constructs of measurement items, factor 193 
extraction with Promax rotation was conducted as suggested by Conway and Huffcutt (2003) 194 
and Zhao et al. (2014b). Meanwhile, the appropriateness of using factor analysis was 195 
evaluated by using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Dziuban and 196 
Shirkey 1974; Norusis 2008). 197 
Table 6 shows the results of factor analysis of measurement items. Five constructs, 198 
namely, immorality, unfairness, opacity, procedural violation, and contractual violation, which 199 
encapsulate 24 measurement items, were generated. This result is in line with the findings of 200 
Tabish and Jha (2011). The KMO value is 0.863, which is higher than the threshold of 0.5 201 
(Norusis 2008). The total variance explained is 61.622%, higher than the common threshold 202 
of 60% adopted in social science research (Hair et al. 2010). Bartlett’s test of sphericity 203 
produced an approximate x2 = 1308.051 (d.f. = 276, p = 0.000), indicating the high 204 
correlations among measurement items (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). Moreover, the 205 
correlation matrix as indicated in Table 7 shows that the five constructs are not highly 206 
correlated with each other at 5% significance level (all of them are insignificantly correlated 207 
with each other), suggesting no multiplier effect among them. Thus, all the statistical 208 
parameters were found to be acceptable to conduct factor analysis. Hair et al. (2010) stated 209 
that the loading of each measurement item on its corresponding construct should not be lower 210 
than 0.5. Therefore, MI6, MI8, MI13, MI 14, and MI17 were excluded from the final list of 211 
measurement items. The remaining measurement items were recoded to facilitate further 212 
11 
research action as shown in Table 6. 213 
     (Please insert Table 6 here.) 214 
     (Please insert Table 7 here.) 215 
Based on the data collected from the questionnaire survey, the weightings of each 216 
measurement item and construct were calculated. The weighting of probability for the m th 217 
measurement item under construct i  ( pimW ) can be computed by the following equation: 218 



n
m
pimpimpim MSMSW
1
 (1),  219 
where pimMS  represents the mean value of the measurement item m ; and n  = the number 220 
of measurement items under the constructi .  221 
The probability weighting of the constructi  ( piW ) can be computed by the similar 222 
equation: 223 



5
1i
pipipi TMSTMSW  (2),  224 
where piTMS  represents the total mean values of measurement items under the constructi .  225 
Similarly, the weighting of severity for m th measurement item under the corresponding 226 
constructi  ( simW ), and the weighting of the constructi  （ siW ）, can be computed by the 227 
same approach. Table 6 shows the weightings of all the measurement items and its related 228 
constructs. 229 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT – FUZZY MEASUREMENT 230 
Considering that the perceptions of probability and severity levels of measurement items by 231 
respondents are typically characterized by subjectivity and uncertainty, and thus are fuzzy by 232 
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nature, the fuzzy set theory was employed to develop the measuring model in this study. 233 
Fuzzy set theory is a branch of modern mathematics that was formulated by Zadeh (1965) to 234 
model vagueness intrinsic in human cognitive process. On the basis of linguistic variables and 235 
membership functions with varying grades, fuzzy set theory allows for the development of 236 
strong and significant instruments for the measurement of ambiguities and provides the 237 
opportunity to represent meaningfully ambiguous concepts expressed in the natural language 238 
(Zimmermann 2001; Gunduz et al. 2013). This approach is quite appropriate to tackle the 239 
complex problems due to the imprecise, uncertain, or unreliable information that characterize 240 
the real world systems (Baloi and Price 2003; Chan et al. 2009; Xia et al. 2011).  241 
    Fuzzy set theory deals with a set of objects characterized by a membership function that 242 
assigns to each object a grade of membership ranging between 0 (no membership) and 1 (full 243 
membership) (Shaheen et al. 2007). Theoretically, membership functions can take various 244 
shapes (Lorterapong and Moselhi 1996). However, in modeling real-life problems, linear 245 
approximation such as triangular fuzzy number (TFN) is frequently used (Chen and Hwang 246 
1992; Zhao et al. 2013b). Additionally, the precision in the shape of the membership functions 247 
is unimportant due to the quantitative nature of the problems with vague predicates, and the 248 
fuzzy numbers with simpler membership function shapes tend to have more intuitive and 249 
more natural interpretation (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila 2011; Zhao et al. 2013b). Therefore, 250 
this study utilizes the TFN to quantify the qualitative data collected via the questionnaire 251 
survey. 252 
    The input data of the proposed model are the values of linguistic variables. Although 253 
linguistic variables have lower quality of exactness than numerical variables whose values are 254 
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numbers, they are more meaningful (Hadipriono 1988). This study defined two linguistic 255 
variables for each measurement item of corruption, namely, the probability and severity, 256 
respectively. A five-Likert scale (i.e. very low, low, medium, high, and very high) was 257 
adopted to assign the linguistic variables as recommended by Zhao et al. (2013b). This rating 258 
system is easy for users to understand these linguistic terms and evaluate the measurement 259 
items of corruption. 260 
The values of linguistic variables were then transformed into triangular fuzzy numbers. 261 
Each fuzzy set has to overlap its neighboring sets to certain extent. While there is no precise 262 
algorithm for determining the minimum or maximum degree of overlap, in most cases, the 263 
overlap for triangle-to-triangle fuzzy regions averages between 25 and 50% of the fuzzy set 264 
base (Cox 1999; Li et al. 2006). Cox (1999) further stated that a high degree of overlap can 265 
ensure any small changes of the rating system be detected and handled immediately. 266 
Therefore, this study adopts 50% as the degree to which each triangular fuzzy region overlaps 267 
its neighboring region. Figure 1 shows the membership functions of various linguistic values. 268 
(Please insert Figure 1 here.) 269 
The TFN of m th measurement item under constructi  in the assessment of probability, 270 
that is pimC~ , can be computed using the following equation: 271 



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1
,,1~1~  (3),  272 
where k  = number of individuals who assess the measurement items; and 1pimjl , 2pimjl , 273 
and 3pimjl  are lower bound, strongest membership degree, and upper bound of pimjC~ , 274 
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respectively. 275 
Then the TFN of constructi  in the assessment of probability, that is piC~ , can be 276 
computed using following equation: 277 
pim
n
m
pimpi WCC  
1
~~  (4),  278 
where n  = number of measurement items under constructi ; and pimW  = weighting of m th 279 
measurement item under constructi  in the assessment of probability, and is available in 280 
Table 6. 281 
The TFN of corruption in the assessment of probability, namely, pC~ , can be computed 282 
using the equation below. 283 
  pi
i
pip WCpppC  

5
1
321 ~,,~  (5),  284 
where piW  = weighting of constructi in the assessment of probability and are available in 285 
Table 5; and 1p , 2p , and 3p  are lower bound, strongest membership degree, and upper 286 
bound of pC~ , respectively. 287 
Similarly, the TFN of corruption in the assessment of severity, namely, 288 
 321 ,,~ sssCs   can be calculated using the same approach. 1s , 2s , and 3s  are lower 289 
bound, strongest membership degree, and upper bound of sC~ , respectively. 290 
Defuzzification is the process of determining a crisp value that adequately represents the 291 
fuzzy number (Georgy et al. 2005). There are several defuzzification methods such as center 292 
of gravity (COG) (calculation of geometric center of the fuzzy outputs), mean of maxima 293 
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(MOM) (mean of the highest membership values of the fuzzy outputs), and bisection (crisp 294 
value that divides the area of the membership function of the fuzzy output into two equally 295 
sized sections), with each one having its strengths and weakness (Filev and Yager 1994; Lam 296 
et al. 2010; Kishore et al. 2011). As this study uses the TFN, the COG is easy to compute, and 297 
the defuzzified value tends to be move smoothly around the output fuzzy region. Thus the 298 
evaluation of corruption in terms of probability ( pC ) and severity ( sC ) can be calculated 299 
using the following equations: 300 



3
1
31
t
tp pC  (6) 301 



3
1
31
t
ts sC  (7) 302 
Finally, the corruption in a public construction project can be calculated by the following 303 
equation as recommended by Xu et al. (2010): 304 
sp CCC   (8) 305 
The potential corruption in a public construction project, namely, C , is a crisp value in 306 
the interval [0, 1] that falls into the regions of two adjacent linguistic terms. The corruption 307 
can be interpreted by the linguistic term that has a higher membership value (Zhao et al. 308 
2013b). 309 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 310 
In December 2013, a real public construction project in Jinan (the capital city of Shandong 311 
Province, eastern China) was contacted to assess its potential corruption using the proposed 312 
16 
model. The project was selected for the following two reasons. First, the project is a typical 313 
public project having a high estimated cost (CNY 23 billion, approximately USD 3.74 billion) 314 
which attracts the intensive attention from the local society. Second, the authors used to 315 
provide consultancy service for this project, which can help obtain data of high reliability 316 
considering the topic of current study is so sensitive. The input data of the model were 317 
collected from five professionals of a consultancy company who were employed to provide 318 
the auditing service in this project. To ensure the reliability of the data, an anonymous and 319 
self-explanatory questionnaire composed of 19 measurement items was distributed to the five 320 
professionals, and the completed questionnaires were collected using a lockbox. The 321 
calculation of potential corruption in this project is illustrated as follows. 322 
    First, the TFN of each measurement item in the assessment of probability was calculated 323 
using Equation (3). For instance, MI1.3, Contractors provide false certificates in bidding, 324 
obtained the linguistic values of high, very high, high, high, and very high from the five 325 
respondents. Figure 1 suggests that the TFNs of high and very high are (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) and 326 
(0.75, 1.00, 1.00), respectively. Therefore, 13~pC  was calculated as follows:  327 
13~pC = 1/5× [(0.50, 0.75, 1.00)+ (0.75, 1.00, 1.00)+ (0.50, 0.75, 1.00)+ (0.50, 0.75, 328 
1.00)+ (0.75, 1.00, 1.00)] 329 
= (0.60, 0.85, 1.00) 330 
Then using the TFNs of measurement items as input in Equation (4) the TFNs of 331 
various constructs was obtained. Finally, the TFNs of various constructs were inputted in 332 
Equation (5) and the TFNs of corruption in terms of probability of this project were obtained. 333 
By using the same approach, the TFNs of each measurement item, each construct, as well as 334 
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the corruption in terms of severity was calculated. Table 8 shows all the values of pimC~ , piC~ , 335 
pC~ , simC~ , siC~ , and sC~ . 336 
Thus, pC  and sC  were computed using Equation (6) and Equation (7) as follows:  337 
  649.0861.0663.0423.031 pC  338 
  648.0891.0651.0402.031 sC  339 
Lastly, potential corruption of this project was computed upon Equation (8): 340 
648.0648.0649.0 C  341 
(Please insert Table 8 here.) 342 
According to Figure 1, the value of C (0.648) fell into the two adjacent regions of 343 
medium and high. The linguistic value of high has a higher membership value than that of 344 
medium when the X value is 0.648. Therefore, the potential corruption level of this project is 345 
high. Additionally, values of various constructs, such as immorality, unfairness, opacity, 346 
procedural violation, and contractual violation, were calculated using the same approach 347 
according to Equation (6), Equation (7), and Equation (8), and the calculating results are as 348 
shown in Figure 2. The results show that the values of immorality and contractual violation 349 
are 0.744 and 0.705, which are greater than 0.625. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 350 
project has high potential corruption levels in terms of immorality and contractual violation. 351 
(Please insert Figure 2 here.) 352 
Unexpectedly, the authors were informed in February 2014 (i.e., two months later than 353 
the model application) that corruption was indeed found in this project. Soon afterwards, the 354 
authors made an additional telephone interview with one professional who participated in the 355 
assessment of the project, and were further informed that one staff of the client and another 356 
18 
staff from the site supervisor had been secretly investigated by the prosecutor since June 2013, 357 
and that they were detained with their corrupt practices confirmed in February 2014. The 358 
professional also mentioned the following main corrupt practices that have been verified by 359 
the prosecutor: (1) fake bidding was conducted by the client and its designated contractor; (2) 360 
some frontline workers hired by the contractor had no practicing certifications thus resulted in 361 
low construction quality; and (3) site supervision engineers took bribe from the contractor and 362 
loosened due supervision. These corrupt acts are exactly reflected in measurement items (e.g. 363 
MI16, MI21, and MI24) under the construct of immorality and contractual violation in the 364 
proposed model. Therefore, the results obtained from the proposed model can be regarded as 365 
reliable. 366 
LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 367 
Although increasing efforts have been invested in recent years to corruption research, few 368 
researchers except for Tabish and Jha (2011) systematically investigated the framework of 369 
measurement items for corruption in the construction sector. That’s why the framework of 370 
Tabish and Jha (2011) was selected as the grounding to establish the corresponding 371 
framework in the context of China. While a series of semi structured interviews have been 372 
conducted to help improve the framework, there is definitely room for the framework to be 373 
perfected via subsequent research input. This is the limitation of the study lies in. 374 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 375 
It is necessary to measure the potential corruption in a public construction project because 376 
19 
such assessment can proactively help reveal the corruption vulnerabilities in the project and 377 
thus facilitate in developing related prevention measures. This study develops a systematic 378 
model to measure corruption in public construction projects in China. Measurement items of 379 
corruption were identified and consolidated via semi structured interviews with 14 industrial 380 
experts and academics. Data collected through a questionnaire survey with 188 experienced 381 
respondents were utilized to examine the underlying constructs of measurement items, and to 382 
calculate the weights of each construct and its related measurement items. Five constructs of 383 
measurement items of corruption, namely, immorality, unfairness, opacity, procedural 384 
violation, and contractual violation were identified in this study. This model further uses 385 
fuzzy set theory to tackle the problems relating to ambiguity, subjectivity, and imprecision 386 
involved in the measurement of corruption and to quantify the linguistic data of each 387 
measurement item. Lastly, this model was applied in a real public construction project to 388 
illustrate its application process.  389 
This model is believed to be particularly useful to a third-party unit responsible for the 390 
supervision of a public construction project. Because it can provide an estimated 391 
measurement of potential corruption in a public construction project, and disclose in which 392 
perspective(s) (i.e., immorality, unfairness, opacity, procedural violation, and contractual 393 
violation) the potential corruption of the project mainly lies in. Despite this study focuses on 394 
the public construction projects in China, the methodology of this study can be applied in 395 
other countries, especially the developing ones. Thus, the implication of this study can be 396 
expanded internationally and contribute to the global body of knowledge for anti-corruption. 397 
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Tables in “Measuring Corruption in Public Construction Projects in China” 582 
Table	1	Backgrounds	of	interviewees	583 
No. Employer Position Experience 
 
Largest project ever 
managed/consulted 
Geographic 
locations* 
A Government  Director  20 years USD $363 million Eastern China 
B Government  Deputy Director 16 years USD $308 million Central China 
C Client  Project Manager 19 years USD $363 million Western China 
D Client  Project Manager  17 years USD $308 million Eastern China 
E Client  Director 13 years USD $167 million Northeastern 
China 
F Contractor  General Manager 25 years USD $363 million Eastern China 
G Contractor  Project Manager  20 years USD $122 million Western China 
H Contractor  Director  15 years USD $85 million Central China 
I Consultant General Manager 20 years USD $363 million Eastern China 
J Consultant  Project Manager 16 years USD $122 million Western China 
K Consultant Project Manager 15 years USD $85 million Northeastern 
China 
L Academic Professor 22 years USD $197 million Central China 
M Academic Professor 17 years USD $73 million Western China 
N Academic Associate Professor  13 years USD $363 million Northeastern 
China 
Note: *Geographic locations are divided into eastern China with GDP per capita about USD 8,600, 584 
central China with GDP per capita about USD 4,700, western China with GDP per capita about USD 585 
4,400, and northeastern China with GDP per capita about USD 6,600, according to the National Bureau 586 
of Statistics of China (2012). 587 
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Table	2	Measurement	items	refined	by	the	interviewees	588 
Code Measurement item  
Applicability 
Evaluation 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Employer Experience* 
Geographic 
locations 
MI1 Administrative approval and 
financial sanction not taken to 
execute the work  
2.79 0.274 0.432 0.358 
MI2 The provisions are not as per laid 
down yardstick 
3.86 0.352 0.423 0.329 
MI3 Work is not executed for the 
same purpose for which the 
sanction was accorded 
2.93 0.462 0.586 0.497 
MI4 The consultant is not appointed 
after proper publicity and open 
competition 
3.64 0.516 0.607 0.509 
MI5 The criteria adopted in 
prequalification of consultant are 
restrictive and benefit only few 
consultants 
3.43 0.687 0.723 0.648 
MI6 The selection of consultant not 
done by appropriate authority 
3.57 0.414 0.580 0.426 
MI7 Adequate & wide publicity is not 
given to tender 
2.71 0.438 0.452 0.379 
MI8 Adequate time for submission of 
tender/offer not given 
2.64 0.649 0.765 0.721 
MI9 Prequalification criteria for 
selection of contractor are 
stringent 
3.00 0.649 0.681 0.752 
MI10 The evaluation of tenders is not 
done exactly as per the notified 
criteria 
2.57 0.350 0.308 0.239 
MI11 The negotiation on tender not 
done as per laid down guidelines 
3.00 0.251 0.235 0.189 
MI12 The conditions/specifications are 
relaxed in favor of contractor to 
whom the work is being awarded 
3.50 0.421 0.462 0.473 
MI13 The work order/supply order is 
not placed within justified rates 
2.71 0.498 0.502 0.535 
31 
Code Measurement item  
Applicability 
Evaluation 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Employer Experience* 
Geographic 
locations 
MI14 Work is executed without the 
availability of funds for the said 
purpose 
3.93 0.547 0.640 0.508 
MI15 The work is not executed as per 
original sanction accorded 
3.93 0.686 0.703 0.604 
MI16 Compliance with conditions 
regarding obtaining licenses, 
insurance policies and 
deployment of technical staff not 
being followed by contractor 
3.71 0.579 0.534 0.406 
MI17 The proper record of hindrances 
is not being maintained from the 
beginning 
2.93 0.663 0.650 0.631 
MI18 The deviations, especially in 
abnormally high rated and high 
value items are not properly 
monitored and verified 
3.29 0.428 0.460 0.325 
MI19 Escalation clause is not applied 
correctly for admissible payment 
3.57 0.492 0.431 0.463 
Note: MI represents for measurement item, 
     KWT represents for Kruskal-Walis Test, 
     Experience* is categorized into two groups following the criteria: below, and above 20 years 
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Table	3	Measurement	items	supplemented	by	the	interviewees	590 
Code Measurement item 
Interviewee Applicability 
Evaluation A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
MI20 A large project should have called for bids is split into several small 
projects and contracted without bidding 
      √  √  √    √    √  √  √    √ 3.40 
MI21 Contractors provide false certificates in bidding √  √  √        √  √    √    √  √    3.96 
MI22 Confidential information of bidding is disclosed to a specific bidder √      √      √    √    √  √    √ 3.76 
MI23 Substitution of unqualified materials in construction √ √    √ √       √ √  √ √ √  √ 3.54 
MI24 Site supervisor neglects his duties for taking bribe from contractor   √  √  √  √        √  √    √  √  √ 3.91 
Note: MI represents for measurement item. 
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Table	4	Profile	of	respondents	592 
Personal 
attributes 
Categories Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Employer Government 20 10.6 
 Client 43 22.9 
 Contractor 43 22.9 
 Consultant 46 24.5 
 Designer 26 13.8 
 Academic 10 5.3 
Position Top managerial level (e.g. director, general 
manager, professor) 
49 26.1 
 Middle managerial level (e.g. project 
manager) 
88 46.8 
 Professional (e.g. engineer, quantity 
surveyor) 
51 27.1 
Experience >20 years 24 12.8 
11-20 years 40 21.3 
 6-10 years 76 40.4 
 <5 years 48 25.5 
Geographic 
locations* 
Eastern China 63 33.5 
Central China 55 29.2 
 Western China 37 19.7 
 Northeastern China 33 17.6 
Note: * Geographic locations are divided into eastern China with GDP per capita about USD 8,600, 593 
central China with GDP per capita about USD 4,700, western China with GDP per capita about USD 594 
4,400, and northeastern China with GDP per capita about USD 6,600, according to the National Bureau 595 
of Statistics of China (2012). 596 
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Table	5	Evaluations	of	the	measurement	items	for	corruption	597 
Code 
Probability Severity 
Mean 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Mean 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Employer Position Experience Geographic location Employer Position Experience Geographic location 
MI1 2.63 0.121 0.236 0.275 0.283 3.30 0.202 0.326 0.378 0.364 
MI2 3.20 0.629 0.534 0.426 0.479 3.50 0.215 0.369 0.475 0.382 
MI3 2.47 0.058 0.102 0.162 0.109 3.31 0.213 0.208 0.253 0.231 
MI4 3.43 0.438 0.472 0.374 0.301 3.26 0.668 0.621 0.643 0.665 
MI5 3.14 0.692 0.613 0.624 0.635 3.14 0.404 0.467 0.478 0.589 
MI6 3.06 0.263 0.241 0.252 0.363 3.00 0.261 0.263 0.274 0.385 
MI7 2.74 0.788 0.739 0.728 0.717 3.05 0.418 0.465 0.454 0.443 
MI8 2.70 0.259 0.278 0.287 0.296 3.06 0.231 0.253 0.275 0.297 
MI9 3.21 0.083 0.105 0.127 0.149 3.34 0.124 0.126 0.148 0.160 
MI10 2.62 0.156 0.178 0.190 0.212 3.37 0.227 0.249 0.261 0.283 
MI11 2.28 0.265 0.287 0.309 0.331 3.50 0.372 0.394 0.416 0.438 
MI12 3.54 0.276 0.298 0.310 0.332 2.92 0.774 0.796 0.818 0.830 
MI13 3.16 0.301 0.323 0.345 0.367 3.51 0.223 0.245 0.267 0.289 
MI14 2.79 0.073 0.095 0.117 0.139 3.51 0.219 0.231 0.253 0.275 
MI15 3.45 0.423 0.467 0.489 0.445 3.69 0.150 0.172 0.194 0.216 
MI16 3.52 0.299 0.311 0.347 0.369 3.61 0.201 0.223 0.245 0.267 
MI17 3.71 0.511 0.535 0.557 0.579 3.80 0.211 0.236 0.258 0.270 
MI18 3.06 0.272 0.294 0.316 0.338 3.60 0.337 0.359 0.371 0.393 
MI19 3.08 0.552 0.574 0.596 0.618 3.28 0.362 0.384 0.406 0.428 
MI20 2.79 0.270 0.292 0.314 0.336 3.51 0.210 0.232 0.254 0.276 
MI21 3.04 0.557 0.579 0.591 0.613 3.70 0.193 0.215 0.237 0.259 
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Code 
Probability Severity 
Mean 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Mean 
Asymp. Sig. of KWT 
Employer Position Experience Geographic location Employer Position Experience Geographic location 
MI22 3.05 0.198 0.210 0.232 0.257 3.73 0.293 0.315 0.337 0.359 
MI23 3.01 0.252 0.274 0.296 0.318 4.06 0.189 0.201 0.223 0.245 
MI24 3.23 0.213 0.235 0.257 0.279 4.00 0.293 0.315 0.327 0.349 
Note: Asymp. Sig. of KWT represents for the asymptotic significance of Kruskal-Wallis test, 
     MI represents for measurement item. 
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Table	6	Factor	analysis	results	and	weighting	calculation	598 
Construct Previous 
code 
New 
code 
Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained 
Weightings 
Probability Severity 
Immorality    33.679% 0.28 0.33 
 MI14 - 0.474  - - 
 MI15 MI1.1 0.727  0.22 0.20 
 MI18 MI1.2 0.696  0.19 0.19 
 MI21 MI1.3 0.673  0.19 0.19 
 MI23 MI1.4 0.735  0.19 0.21 
 MI24 MI1.5 0.750  0.21 0.21 
Unfairness    9.718% 0.29 0.24 
 MI4 MI2.1 0.797  0.21 0.20 
 MI5 MI2.2 0.849  0.19 0.19 
 MI6 - 0.451  - - 
 MI9  MI2.3 0.708  0.20 0.20 
 MI12 MI2.4 0.636  0.22 0.18 
 MI22 MI2.5 0.654  0.18 0.23 
Opacity    6.644% 0.18 0.19 
 MI7 MI3.1 0.720  0.26 0.23 
 MI8 - 0.482  - - 
 MI10 MI3.2 0.752  0.25 0.25 
 MI11 MI3.3 0.759  0.22 0.26 
 MI20 MI3.4 0.616  0.27 0.26 
Procedural Violation    6.300% 0.14 0.14 
 MI1 MI4.1 0.742  0.32 0.33 
 MI2 MI4.2 0.707  0.38 0.34 
 MI3 MI4.3 0.640  0.30 0.33 
 MI17  - 0.440  - - 
Contractual Violation    5.281% 0.11 0.10 
 MI13 - 0.443  - - 
 MI16  MI5.1 0.573  0.53 0.52 
 MI19 MI5.2 0.746  0.47 0.48 
Note: Cumulative variance explained 61.622 %, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.863, 
Significance of Bartlett's Test of Sphericity = 1308.051 (p = 0.000), 
MI represents for measurement item. 
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Table	7	Correlation	matrix	among	the	five	constructs	of	measurement	items	of	corruption	599 
Construct Immorality Unfairness Opacity Procedural 
violation 
Contractual 
violation 
Immorality 1     
Unfairness 0.441 1    
Opacity 0.303 0.390 1   
Procedural 
violation 
0.464 0.351 0.190 1  
Contractual 
violation 
0.263 0.336 0.201 0.315 1 
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
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Table	8	Illustrative	example	of	the	model	application	600 
Measurement item Probability Severity 
 
pimC~  pimW  piC~  piW  pC~  simC~  simW  siC~  siW  sC~  
Immorality   (0.57, 0.80, 0.96) 0.28 (0.160, 0.224, 0.269)   (0.46, 0.71, 0.95) 0.33 (0.152, 0.234, 0.314) 
MI1.1 (0.65, 0.90, 1.00) 0.22    (0.55, 0.80, 1.00) 0.20    
MI1.2 (0.50, 0.75, 0.95) 0.19    (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.19    
MI1.3 (0.60, 0.85, 1.00) 0.19    (0.40, 0.65, 0.90) 0.19    
MI1.4 (0.55, 0.80, 0.95) 0.19    (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.21    
MI1.5 (0.55, 0.70, 0.90) 0.21    (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.21    
Unfairness   (0.39, 0.64, 0.86) 0.29 (0.113, 0.186, 0.249)    (0.31, 0.56, 0.81) 0.24 (0.074, 0.134, 0.194) 
MI2.1 (0.40, 0.65, 0.85) 0.21    (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) 0.20    
MI2.2 (0.40, 0.65, 0.85) 0.19    (0.20, 0.45, 0.70) 0.19    
MI2.3 (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.20    (0.40, 0.65, 0.90) 0.20    
MI2.4 (0.45, 0.70, 0.90) 0.22    (0.20, 0.45, 0.70) 0.18    
MI2.5 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) 0.18    (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.23    
Opacity    (0.23, 0.47, 0.71) 0.18 (0.041, 0.085, 0.128)    (0.41, 0.66, 0.87) 0.19 (0.077, 0.124, 0.164) 
MI3.1 (0.20, 0.45, 0.70) 0.26    (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) 0.23    
MI3.2 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) 0.25    (0.40, 0.65, 0.90) 0.25    
MI3.3 (0.10, 0.30, 0.55) 0.22    (0.45, 0.70, 0.90) 0.26    
MI3.4 (0.35, 0.60, 0.80) 0.27    (0.50, 0.75, 0.90) 0.26    
Procedural Violation    (0.38, 0.60, 0.81) 0.14 (0.053, 0.084, 0.113)    (0.40, 0.65, 0.90) 0.14 (0.056, 0.091, 0.126) 
MI4.1 (0.35, 0.55, 0.75) 0.32    (0.45, 0.70, 0.95) 0.33    
MI4.2 (0.40, 0.60, 0.80) 0.38    (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) 0.34    
MI4.3 (0.40, 0.65, 0.90) 0.30    (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) 0.33    
Contractual Violation    (0.51, 0.76, 0.93) 0.11 (0.056, 0.084, 0.102)    (0.43, 0.68, 0.93) 0.10 (0.043, 0.068, 0.093) 
MI5.1 (0.60, 0.85, 1.00) 0.53     (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) 0.52    
MI5.2 (0.40, 0.65, 0.85) 0.47     (0.35, 0.60, 0.85) 0.48    
Total     1 (0.423, 0.663, 0.861)    1 (0.402, 0.651, 0.891) 
Note: pimC~  represents for the triangular fuzzy number of mth measurement item under construct i in the assessment of probability,  601 
39 
simC~  represents for the triangular fuzzy number of mth measurement item under construct i in the assessment of severity,  602 
pimW  represents for the weighting of mth measurement item under construct i in the assessment of probability,  603 
simW represents for the weighting of mth measurement item under construct i in the assessment of severity,  604 
piC~  represents for the triangular fuzzy number of construct i in the assessment of probability,  605 
siC~  represents for the triangular fuzzy number of construct i in the assessment of severity,  606 
piW   represents for the weighting of construct i in the assessment of probability,  607 
siW   represents for the weighting of construct i in the assessment of severity,  608 
pC~   represents for the triangular fuzzy number of corruption in the assessment of probability,  609 
sC~   represents for the triangular fuzzy number of corruption in the assessment of severity. 610 
